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Cartesio and Grunkin-Paul: Mutual Recognition as a Vested Rights 
Theory Based on Party Autonomy in Private Law 
 
Jan-Jaap Kuipers* 
 
I. Introduction: Private international law and community law 
 
PIL lawyers often submit that their topic is neglected by Community lawyers.1 It is 
true that the EEC Treaty merely made one reference to PIL, stipulating that member states 
will enter with each other into negotiations concerning the simplification of recognition and 
enforcement of judicial decisions,2 which resulted in the Brussels I Convention.3 The 1980 
Convention on the Law applicable to Contractual Obligations even had no direct basis in the 
EEC Treaty. Member states simply desired to continue the unification of PIL as set in motion 
by the Brussels I Convention in the field of applicable law.4 Striking was that both 
instruments were international conventions and not Community instruments. With the small 
role PIL has played in the early years of the Community in the back of our mind, it seems not 
self-evident to search for an explanation of the Cartesio and Garcia Avello decisions in PIL. 
In recent years however, the Community interest in PIL has been growing. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam introduced the first direct PIL competence: the Community is empowered to take 
measures in the field of PIL when this is necessary for the internal market (art. 65 EC). The 
Treaty of Nice lowered, save in family matters, the voting requirements from unanimity to 
qualified majority voting. The Lisbon Treaty will continue this trend: art. 81 TFEU empowers 
the Community to take legislative measures in particular when necessary for the internal 
market.5 Anno 2009, the Brussels and Rome Conventions have been transformed into 
regulations and more codification projects have been undertaken by the EC.6  
                                               
1
 J. BASEDOW, “The Communitarisation of the Conflict of laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam”, in: Common 
Market Law Review, 2000, vol. 37, pp. 687-708; H. JESSURUN d’OLIVERIA, “The EU and a Metamorphosis 
of Private International Law”, in: J. FAWCETT ed., Reform and Development of Private International Law: 
Essays in honours of Sir Peter North, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 111-136, at p. 119. K. 
BOELE-WOELKI and R. VAN OOIK, “The Communitarization of Private International Law”, Yearbook of 
Private International Law, 2002, vol. 4, pp. 1-36. 
2
 Art. 220 EEC (currently 293 EC) 
3
 OJ L 299/32 (1972). 
4
 OJ L 266/19 (1980), compare the 3rd recital of the preamble. 
5
 G. DE GROOT and J.-J. KUIPERS, “The New Provisions on Private International Law in the Treaty of 
Lisbon”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2008, vol. 15, (1) pp. 109-114. 
6
 For example: Proposal for a Council Regulation of 15 December 2005 on jurisdiction, applicable law, 
recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations COM 
(2005) 649 final and the Green Paper on succession and wills COM (2005) 65 final. 
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There is still a long a way to go. In a number of judgments on the Brussels I 
Regulation the ECJ has far from rebutted the old criticism that Community lawyers have a 
poor understanding of PIL. The Court seems more concerned with the mandatory nature of 
the Regulation rather than preserving its underlying PIL rationale.7 The growing interest of 
the Community in PIL is however quite understandable. The general consensus seems to be 
that, despite calls for the creation of a European Civil Code,8 the Community has no 
competence to introduce a comprehensive codification.9 Even the Commission has 
acknowledged that some areas of private law will not be harmonised in the near future, or 
even never.10 Such areas will essentially be governed by national private law. Private 
international law constitutes a good alternative for harmonisation of private laws since it is 
able enhance legal certainty while at the same time does not necessitate any change of 
substantive and is therefore better able to respect legal diversity.11 The absence or 
impossibility of positive harmonisation of private law does however not exclude the 
possibility of negative harmonisation. In other words, although a certain rule is completely 
national in nature it still has to be in conformity with (primary) Community law.12  
 
The application of a conflict of law rule will not in all cases be compatible with the 
exercise of the fundamental freedoms or European Citizenship. If member states apply to 
every situation their own conflict of law rule, it might occur that a situation is lawful in one 
member state but not recognised, or even unlawful in another member state. The application 
of the Savignian conflict of law rule, based on the localisation of the centre of gravity or 
natural seat of a legal relationship, to rights duly formed seems not apt to deal with these 
problems satisfactorily. Member states do not always agree about what constitutes the natural 
seat of a legal relationship. They apply their own conflict of law norms to determine whether a 
                                               
7
 J. HARRIS, “Understanding the English response to the Europeanisation of Private International Law”, 
Journal of Private International Law, 2008, vol. 4, pp. 347-395.   
8
 European Parliament Resolution Pb C 158/400 (1989). See: M. RÖTTINGER, “Towards a European Code 
Napoléon/ABGB/BGB? Recent EC Activities for a European Contract Law”, European Law Journal, 2006, vol. 
12, pp. 807-827.  
9
 W. VAN GERVEN, “The ECJ Case law as a Means of Unification of Private Law?”, in: A. Hartkamp (ed.), 
Towards a European Civil Code, Nijmegen, Ars Aequi Libri, 2005,  p. 102. 
10
 Commissioner Vitorino: “Il existe certains domaines du droit civil en du droit pénal, tant en ce qui concerne le 
fond que la procédure, qui ne seront pas harmonisés pendant très longtemps entre les membres de l’Union 
européene, et peut-être même jamais”, quoted in: O. REMIEN, “Private International Law, the European 
Community and its Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, Common Market Law Review, 2001, vol. 
26, p. 63. 
11
 H. MUIR-WATT, “European Integration, legal diversity and the Conflict of Laws”, Edinburgh Law Review, 
2005, vol. 9, pp. 6-31.  
12
 ECJ, Case C-120/95, Decker, 1998 ECR I-1831, para. 22-23; ECJ, Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, 2005 
ECR I-10837, par. 29. 
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right has been validly created. The resulting legal uncertainty is detrimental for a common 
European justice area. This critique does not mean that PIL as such is inadequate. The 
Savagnian, multilateral conflict of law rule is merely one conception of PIL and could be 
complemented or replaced by others. 
 
Connection may be sought with the principle of mutual recognition. In the free 
movement of goods, mutual recognition means that if a French manufacturer can lawfully 
market its goods in France it should in principle also be allowed to do the same in Germany. 
Similarly, one could argue that if a situation is lawful in France, it should in principle also be 
lawful in Germany. Rights acquired in one jurisdiction should in principle also be sustained in 
other jurisdictions. The rebirth of acquired, or vested rights fits into the changing paradigm of 
PIL. Due to increasing globalisation individuals are increasingly replacing a strong link with 
one state with several looser links to different states. Recent technological developments have 
provided the individual with more factual possibilities to escape the state model, leading to a 
stronger private autonomy. With the increased possibility to circumvent the conflict of law 
rules of states and the interference of public law considerations becoming more and more an 
exception, the decline of the conflict of law rule has been set in.13 
 
In the next sections it will be demonstrated that the ECJ case law relating to the 
transfer of undertakings and concerning surname law is neither of a completely Community 
law, nor national company law but also not really (traditional) PIL nature. It will be explored 
to what extent a vested rights doctrine can be retrieved in the court’s decisions and what 
possible general conclusions can be drawn for private law. By referring to academic 
interpretations of the ECJ case law, it will be demonstrated that the PIL perspective has often 
been neglected.  
 
II. The case of company law: A right to enter, not to exit? 
 
The core principle of the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation is the 
mutual recognition of judgments between member states. Member states cannot apply their 
                                               
13
 C. PAMBOUKIS, “La renaissance-métamorphose de la méthode de reconnaissance”, Revue Critique de Droit 
International Privé, 2008, vol. 97, pp. 513-560, at p. 519. 
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own substantive law to check the content of a judgment rendered in another member state.14 
The Treaty of Lisbon would have incorporated mutual recognition as guiding principle for 
PIL in a common European Justice Area. One of the core pillars of European PIL is thus the 
confidence in the conflict of law mechanism of other member states. With this idea in the 
back of our mind it might be interesting to shortly revisit the case law of the ECJ concerning 
the freedom of establishment of companies and analyse the role of mutual confidence. Art. 48 
in conjunction with art. 43 confers upon companies or firms that are formed in accordance 
with the law of a member state and have their registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business within the Community the freedom of establishment. 15 The article 
does however not provide for a clear-cut right of transfer.16  
 
In Daily Mail a company desired to move its headquarters from the United Kingdom to 
the Netherlands, but this was opposed by the UK authorities.17 The Court held that, with a view 
to the widely differing connecting factors between the member states, Community law as it 
stood did therefore not confer a right upon Daily Mail, incorporated under the legislation of 
England, and having its registered office there to transfer its central management and control 
to the Netherlands. 
 
In Centros the Court held the refusal to register a branch of companies duly formed 
under the law of another member state to be a restriction on the freedom of establishment.18 
The host member state (Denmark) could not impose upon a company which had been duly 
formed in England its own substantive company law. Although Denmark was allowed to 
impose safeguards to avoid evasion of its laws, the refusal did not pass the suitability test. The 
registration of a branch of a company that carried out business in the UK would have equally 
deprived Danish creditors of their protection.19  
 
                                               
14
 The Brussels I Regulation provides for a narrow public policy exception to refuse a foreign judgment. Usually 
this will require a breach of fundamental rights, such as art. 6 ECHR. Case C-7/98, Krombach, 2000 ECR I-
1935; Case C-394/07, Gambazzi, 2009 ECR I-0000, see: as well in the UK: Court of Appeal, Maronier v 
Larmer, 2002 EWCA Civ 774. 
15
 The incorporation theory declares the lex societas (law applicable to the company) to be the law of the place 
where company is registered, whereas the real seat doctrine declares the law of the place applicable where the 
company has its main centre of business.  See: S. RAMMELOO, Corporations in Private International Law: A 
European Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
16
 A proposal for the 14th Company Law Directive on the transfer of undertakings is in the pipeline. See: Draft 
Report with recommendations to the Commission on cross-borders transfers of company seats (2008/2196(INI)). 
17
 ECJ, Case 81/87, Daily Mail v. UK, 1988 ECR 5483. 
18
 Centros, para. 20 and 21. 
19
 Centros, par. 35. 
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In Überseering, a company was denied legal standing as plaintiff in a legal proceeding 
because after a transfer of ownership it had moved its actual centre of business from the 
Netherlands to Germany.20 The shift of actual centre of business without any change in legal 
personality was possible under Dutch PIL, but not under German. The Court held that a 
company duly set up under the legislation of one member state can ‘transfer its registered 
office or its actual centre of administration to another member state without losing its legal 
personality under the law of the member state of incorporation, and, in certain circumstances, 
the rules relating to that transfer, are determined by the national law in accordance with which 
the company was incorporated’.21  
 
In Inspire Art the Netherlands sought to impose additional registration requirements 
upon pseudo foreign companies, including a minimum capital requirement.22 The additional 
requirements failed the proportionality test: potential creditors were already sufficiently warned 
by the fact that Inspire Art held itself out as a company governed by the law of England and not 
by the law of the Netherlands.23 The Court favoured self-help: potential creditors in the 
Netherlands should apparently know that the minimum capital requirements in England are 
significantly more lenient than in the Netherlands and could therefore take appropriate securities 
to ascertain the fulfilment of Inspire Arts obligations. 
 
In its judgments the ECJ did not seem to attach much importance to the distinction 
between primary and secondary establishment, nor to the intention of the undertaking to evade 
stricter standards in the host member state. The essence of the internal market is that individuals 
can take advantage of differences between national legislations. Academic commentators 
predicted a regulatory competition, or a race to the bottom whereby member states would try to 
attract as many companies as possible by offering the most lenient standards.24  It is true that 
                                               
20
 ECJ, Case C-208/00, Überseering, 2002 ECR I-9919. 
21
 Cartesio, par. 107. 
22
 ECJ, Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, 2003 ECR I-10155. 
23
 Inspire Art, par. 135. 
24
 On the debate: M. SIEMS, “Convergence, competition, Centros and Conflicts of Law: European Company 
Law in the 21st Century”, European Law Review, 2002, vol. 27, pp. 47-59; G. SPINDLER and O. BERNER, 
“Inspire Art - Der europäische Wettbewerb um das Gesellschaftsrecht ist endgültig eröffnet”, Recht der 
internationalen Wirtschaft, 2003, p. 949;  C. KIRCHNER, R. PAINTER and W. KAAL, Regulatory 
Competition in EU Corporate Law After Inspire Art: Unbundling Delaware’s Product for Europe, University of 
Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper no. LE04-001 (2004); E. KIENINGER, “The Legal Framework of 
Regulatory Competition Based on Company Mobility: EU and US Compared”, German Law Journal, 2005, vol. 
6, pp. 741-770; J. McCAHERY, “Harmonisation in European Company Law: The Political Economy of 
Economic Integration”, in: D. CURTIN et al. (eds.), European Integration and Law, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 
2006, pp. 155-194. 
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after the judgments member states started revising their company and private international laws. 
For example, in the Netherlands the European developments were specifically named as reason 
for the proposal to make the limited liability company (BV) more internationally competitive by 
abolishing the minimum capital requirement and introducing in general more flexibility.25  
 
III. Real seat doctrine ‘buried alive’ 
 
The decisions in Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art made many question whether 
Daily Mail was still standing. Did the ECJ, despite its vow to respect the plurality of connecting 
factors, not give the dead blow to the real seat doctrine or at least give preference to the 
incorporation theory?26 The Austrian Oberste Gerichtshof  (Supreme Court, OGH) answered 
that question apparently in the affirmative. The OGH held, without making a reference to the 
ECJ, the application of the real seat doctrine to companies established in other member states to 
be incompatible with the freedom of establishment.27 There seemed to be a broad consensus that 
the rationale of the ECJ with regard to host member state also affected the position on the 
member state of origin. The distinction made by the Court between restrictions imposed by host 
member state and the member state of origin was found unconvincing.28 It even led an AG to 
conclude that the distinction was artificial and found no support in the wording of the 
judgments.29 Although the Court reaffirmed in Überseering and Inspire Art its distinction 
between the relation of the company with the member state of incorporation and the member 
                                               
25
 Memorie van Toelichting, Wijziging van Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met de aanpassing 
van de regeling voor besloten vennootschappen met beperkte aansprakelijkheid (Wet vereenvoudiging en 
flexibilisering bv-recht), Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2006-2007, 31 058, no. 3. At the time of writing, 
the bill was still pending in the Tweede Kamer (House of Commons). 
26
 H. HALHUBER, “Das ende der Sitztheorie als Kompetenztheorie- Das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs 
in der Rechtssache C- 208-00 (Überseering)”, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, 2003, vol. 8, pp. 418-438 
S. RAMMELOO, “Vrij verkeer van rechtspersonen in Europa na HvJ EG Überseering. Ipr-zetelleeercontroverse 
beslecht?”, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, 2003, pp. 134-144; S. RAMMELOO, “Vrij verkeer van 
rechtspersonen in Europa na HvJ EG Inspire Art: zetelleercontroverse beslecht!”, Nederlands Internationaal 
Privaatrecht, 2004, pp. 283-295. S. RAMMELOO, “Freedom of Establishment for Legal Persons in Europe 
Accomplished”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2004, vol. 11, pp. 398-413. For an 
overview: H. MUIR-WATT, Case Note to Inspire Art, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé, 2004, vol 
93, pp. 151-184. 
27
 OGH, Beschluss v. July 15, 1999 -- 6 Ob 123/99 b, ‘Der Begriff "Ansässigkeit" setze eine enge wirtschftliche 
Verbindung mit der Gemeinschaft voraus, es müsse somit Hauptverwaltung oder Hauptniederlassung in einem 
Mitgliedstaat, nicht notwendig aber im Gründungsstaat, begründet sein.’ see: M. HEIDINGER, “Austria: 
Company Law -- Branch Office”, Journal of International Banking Law, 2000, vol. 15, p. 8. More correct is the 
decision of the German BGH, Bundesgerichtshof 13 March 2003 (BGHZ 154/185): “Diese Anknüpfungsregel 
(Sitztheorie) werde durch die im EG-Vertrag geregelte Niederlassungsfreiheit nicht verdrängt”. 
28
 W. RINGE, “No freedom of migration for European Companies?”, European Business Law Review, 2005, 
vol. 16, pp. 621-642. 
29
 AG COLOMER  in Uberseering, par. 37. 
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state of registration, it could not count on academic approval. To quote a leading textbook on 
EU law: 
 
“Although the ECJ distinguished the Daily Mail case on its facts (where the restriction on the company’s 
right to retain legal personality in the event of a transfer of registered office or centre of administration was 
imposed by the member state of incorporation), the reality is that the reasoning in Überseering clearly 
moves away from the underlying broad rationale in Daily Mail”.30 
 
A Hungarian law professor therefore decided to set up a company (Cartesio) and test the 
compatibility of a Hungarian law providing the loss of Hungarian legal personality in the case 
of transfer of the real seat of an undertaking abroad. Would the ECJ in Cartesio abandon Daily 
Mail? 
 
IV. Cartesio 
 
In Cartesio a company wished to transfer its real seat from Hungary to Italy whilst 
retaining its incorporation in Hungary and thus without changing the lex societas.31 Hungary 
provided in such cases for the loss of Hungarian legal personality and required the prior winding 
up and liquidation of the company.32 AG Maduro concluded that art. 43 in conjunction with art. 
48 precluded “national rules which make it impossible for a company constituted under national 
law to transfer its operational headquarters to another member state”.33 The AG however 
formulated a reply to a question different than posed by the referring court and answered by the 
ECJ. What was at stake was not whether Hungary could prevent the establishment of Cartesio in 
Italy, but whether Hungary could provide for the loss of Hungarian legal personality. The 
refusal of the right to maintain Hungarian law as lex societas did in itself not prevent the 
relocation to Italy. The AG argued that the case law on the right to establishment evolved since 
Daily Mail and repeated the well-known criticism that the distinction between laws that restrict 
the freedom of establishment in the member state of origin and the host member state was 
                                               
30
  P. CRAIG and G. de BURCA, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th ed., Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, p. 810. 
31
 ECJ, Case C-216-06 Cartesio, 2008 ECR I-0000. 
32
 There is confusion as to whether Hungary adheres to the real seat or incorporation doctrine. See: V. KOROM 
and P. METZINGER, “Freedom of Establishment for Companies: The European Court of Justice Confirms and 
Refines its Daily Mail Decision in the Cartesio”; ECJ, Case C-210/06, European Company and Financial Law 
Review, 2009, vol. 6 (1), pp. 125-161, at pp. 141-144. For the present purposes it is sufficient that Hungary did 
not foresee in the transfer of real seat without changing legal personality.  
33
 AG MADURO in Cartesio, par. 35. 
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unconvincing. He added that in particular the distinction did not fit in the general analytical 
framework of the Court with regard to arts. 43 and 48 EC.  The emphasis on the laws that 
restrict the freedom of establishment rather than the rights of the individual is the key as to why 
the AG was not followed by the Court. 
 
The Court pointed out that while in Überseering Dutch law (incorporation theory) 
provided for a right of to the company to transfer its actual centre of business abroad, Hungarian 
law did not. 
 
“Consequently, in accordance with Article 48 EC, in the absence of a uniform Community law definition 
of the companies which may enjoy the right of establishment on the basis of a single connecting factor 
determining the national law applicable to a company, the question whether Article 43 EC applies to a 
company which seeks to rely on the fundamental freedom enshrined in that article – like the question 
whether a natural person is a national of a member state, hence entitled to enjoy that freedom – is a 
preliminary matter which, as Community law now stands, can only be resolved by the applicable national 
law. In consequence, the question whether the company is faced with a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment, within the meaning of Article 43 EC, can arise only if it has been established, in the light of 
the conditions laid down in Article 48 EC, that the company actually has a right to that freedom”.34 
 
So the power of a member state to define the connecting factor to determine whether a 
company is regarded as incorporated under its laws includes the power to refuse a company 
governed by its law to retain that status if it desires to re-establish in another member state by 
moving its real seat. Did the ECJ then fully confirm Daily Mail? Not really, in an obiter dictum 
the Court continued that the power to define the connecting factor did not place the rules on 
transfer of undertakings outside the scope of Community law. Those rules came under the 
scrutiny of the freedom of establishment to the extent that the law of the member state of origin 
allows for a transfer. Contrary to Daily Mail the Court held that the winding-up or liquidation of 
the company prior to a transfer to another member state would violate the freedom of 
establishment if it could not be justified by an overriding public interest.35 
 
A lot can be said about the judgment.36 The impossibility under the law of the member 
state of incorporation to re-establish an undertaking in another member states can be easily 
                                               
34
 Cartesio, par. 109. 
35
 Cartesio, par. 112-113. 
36
 P. BEHRENS, “Cartesio bestätigt, aber korrigiert Daily Mail”, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 
2009, vol. 20, V. M. PIEßKALLA, “EuGH: Verhinderbare Gesellschaftssitzverlegung in einen anderen 
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circumvented by performing a so-called vertical merger in reverse.37 If Hungarian law would 
not provide for the possibility of re-incorporation in Italy, Cartesio could simply establish an 
empty shell in Italy and subsequently merge the two legal entities whereby the Hungarian 
company would transfer all of it assets and be completely absorbed by the Italian company. The 
ECJ held in Sevic Systems that the commercial registrar of the member state of the first 
undertaking (empty shell) is obliged to register a cross-border merger by dissolution without 
liquidation of one company and transfer of the whole of its assets to another company if such 
registration is possible when both companies are established within the member state 
involved.38  Cartesio would of course then have to accept that the lex societas of the new legal 
entity is to be determined by Italian law, and will presumably be Italian. 
 
The Court explicitly draws a parallel with the status of natural persons. Art. 43 however 
guarantees for individuals also the right to exit. The discrepancy in the approach towards the 
home member state in cases relating to the establishment of legal and natural persons has been 
found unconvincing.39 The analogy between legal and natural persons can however not fully 
been maintained. Unlike natural persons, legal persons are creatures of law and only exist by 
grace of the national law. It is very well possible for an individual to have multiple nationalities, 
but it would be highly infeasible for a company to have multiple ‘nationalities’ and 
subsequently be governed by various laws. Although one can require companies to give up their 
legal nationality, one cannot require citizens to give up their nationality when moving to another 
member state. It is for this reason the ECJ does not prohibit member states from refusing a 
company to retain legal personality under its laws when the company moves beyond the 
boundaries of the jurisdiction involved.  
 
Cartesio could invoke a right against Hungary since Hungary already recognised all 
privileges resulting from incorporation under Hungarian law.40 Has the ECJ by refining, but in 
                                                                                                                                                   
Mitgliedstaat als den Gründungsmitgliedstaat – Cartesio”, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2009, 
vol. 20, pp. 75-83; C. GERNER- BEUERLE and M. SCHILLING, “The Mysteries of Freedom of 
Establishment after Cartesio”, 2009, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1340964, KOROM/ 
METZINGER, supra note 32. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the various 
interpretations of Cartesio. 
37
 U. KLINKE, “European Company Law and the ECJ: The Court’s judgments in the years 2001-2004”, 
European Company and Financial Law Review, 2005, pp. 275-304. 
38
 It is assumed that the registration of a vertical merger without liquidation of one of the parties is possible under 
Italian law. 
39
 PIEßKALLA supra note 36, p. 82. 
40
 There might be situations conceivable where a right against the home member state can be invoked. For 
example when a tax scheme allows for the off-sett of losses incurred by subsidiaries for the benefit of the parent 
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the main confirming Daily Mail implicitly overturned Centros? Is regulatory competition now 
dead? The wide interpretation of Centros and Überseering as nails to the coffin of the real seat 
doctrine can certainly no longer be maintained, but that interpretation was incorrect anyway. 
What the Court did in those cases was oblige the host member state to recognise a company 
duly set up under the laws of another member state. As the section below will demonstrate, the 
decision of the Court in Cartesio is in harmony with Centros and in harmony with the approach 
the Court takes in the area of surname law. 
 
V. The vested rights theory reborn 
 
A company duly set up under the law of one member state shall be recognised in other 
member states. The language of the Court might sound familiar to the older generation of 
common lawyers. It seems the revival of a PIL doctrine declared dead many years ago. It was 
the Frisian scholar Ulrik Huber (1636-1694) who developed the idea that comity (fellowship 
of nations)41 and the general pressure of international commerce required that acts duly 
performed in one jurisdiction shall be sustained in other jurisdictions. This idea became very 
influential in common law jurisdictions, in the form of the vested rights doctrine.42 There has 
never been a universal conception of the vested rights doctrine.43 In England the theory was 
most notably promulgated by Dicey who presumed that in English courts the applicable law 
was always English, but that English law would enforce rights duly acquired under foreign 
law unless this would violate English public policy.44 In the United States, Beale favoured the 
universal recognition of rights created by the appropriate law.45 Unlike Dicey, Beale 
formulated a rule to determine the law that created those rights: the law of the place where the 
last legal act necessary for the completion of the right took place.46 The vested rights theory 
                                                                                                                                                   
company, this right would also apply to subsidiaries set up and operating in other member states. The home 
member state of the parent is then bound to recognise the capacity of the subsidiary awarded by the home 
member state of the subsidiary. ECJ, Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v HM’s Inspector of Taxes 2005 
ECR I-10837. 
41
 H. YNTEMA, “The Comity Doctrine”, in: E. VON CAEMMERER, A. NIKISCH and K. ZWEIGERT, 
(eds.), Vom Deutschen zum Europäischen Recht, Festschrift für Hans Dölle, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, bd. II , 
1963, pp. 65-72. 
42
 P.M. NORTH and J.J. FAWCETT, Cheshire and North Private International Law, 11th ed., London, 
Butterworths, 1987, p. 21; L. STRIKWERDA, Fries recht in Amerika. Over Ulrik Huber, Jospeh Story en 
internationale contracten, Groninger Opmerkingen en Medelingen IV, 1987, p. 55.  
43
 J. MAURY, “Règles générales des conflits de lois”, Recueil des Cours, 1936, vol. 57, p. 329. 
44
 A. DICEY, “On Private International Law as a Branch of the Law of England”, Law Quarterly Review, 1890, 
vol. 6, pp. 1-21 and pp. 113-137, at pp. 114-118. 
45
 J. BEALE, “Dicey’s Conflict of Laws”, Harvard Law Review, 1986, vol. 10, p. 168. 
46
 R. MICHAELS, “EU Law as Private International Law? The Country-of-Origin Principle and Vested Rights 
Theory”, Journal of Private International Law, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 195-242, at p. 215. 
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was also influential in French academia.47 For Pillet the enforcement of a vested right was not 
a conflict of laws; at stake was not the question which jurisdiction was entitled to create it, but 
under what conditions a right had to be recognised in a jurisdiction different from which 
created it.48 Pillet created in addition to the acquired rights doctrine a full system for 
designating the applicable law.49  
 
VI. Vested rights and mutual recognition 
 
The vested rights doctrine has some striking similarities with the principle of mutual 
recognition.50 In essence, the principle of mutual recognition combined with a country of 
origin principle is nothing more than the inability of the host member state to apply its 
legislation to a situation when that situation is already covered by the legislation of the home 
member state.51 Neither the principle of mutual recognition nor the vested rights doctrine 
determines by itself the applicable law.52 The fact that Germany cannot apply its beer purity 
laws to French imports does not mean French law is applicable, but rather that Germany 
cannot apply its legislation to French beer when that legislation is more restrictive than French 
legislation. Vested rights can seem circular. The question that duly acquired rights have to be 
respected does not answer the question according to which law the rights have to be 
established. An additional concept that can determine the competent legal order(s) is therefore 
necessary. Similarly, it is not in the scope of the principle of mutual recognition and vested 
rights to completely replace the otherwise applicable law. Regulatory gaps may therefore 
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occur.53 Finally, from a political legitimacy perspective it can be argued that both doctrines do 
not necessarily attribute regulatory competence to the member state with the largest regulatory 
interest. Was the regulatory interest of Germany to control the sale of spirits on its territory 
not larger than the regulatory interest of France to promote exports?54 Did Denmark not have 
a larger regulatory interest in the registration of the Danish branch of an English company that 
factually carried out no business in the United Kingdom? 
 
For Michaels mutual recognition demonstrates a paradigm shift in PIL. The country of 
origin principle “is a choice-of-law principle albeit not one according to classical conflict of 
laws but a new form of vested rights principle”.55 Although it is beyond doubt that the vested 
rights doctrine is a PIL principle, one can doubt whether vested rights are really a new form of 
mutual recognition. Mutual recognition concerns public law rules, or since the divide between 
public and private in Community law seems to be fading more and more,56 rules concerning 
administrative authorisations, prudential supervision or product quality.57  
 
Community law is in principle not interested in origin or national classification of a 
rule. Rather the ECJ establishes the restrictive effects of a rule on the internal market. So, why 
would Community law care about the public/private distinction, especially since there is on 
the continent no common consensus about what is public and what is private and moreover, 
the distinction as such is rejected by the common law traditions?58 The meaning of the 
public/private divide should be interpreted in the light of the original objective of the 
Community: the creation of an internal market by the elimination of artificially created 
obstacles to trade. Community law thus, with the exception of competition laws, principally 
did not address horizontal relations but was addressed to member states. Mutual recognition 
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was developed in this framework. Starting with Defrenne II,59 where the ECJ held that the 
non-discrimination principle embodied in art. 141 EC also applied in a contract between two 
private parties, the influence of Community law in private law was gradually acknowledged. 
The Court first recognised in the nineties the direct applicability of art. 39 EC in a purely 
private dispute60 and later accepted the same with regard to the freedom of establishment.61 
Also regulations can be directly applied between two individuals.62 Despite the growing 
acknowledgement of the role of private law it is clear that the Community lacks a general 
competence in private law. 
 
Indeed the public/private distinction is on itself of little value, but its underlying 
rationale helps to explain why we should approach rules concerning administrative 
authorisations, prudential supervision or product quality different from rules exclusively 
interfering with private relations. Public laws are by definition mandatory and its application 
can therefore not be evaded by private parties. Rules in private law, even when they are 
mandatory, can be avoided by parties to an international contract. In Ahlstom Atlantique the 
ECJ held that rules whose application can be avoided by the parties by a simple choice of law 
are not able to constitute a restriction to the internal market.63 Artificially created obstacles to 
trade created by ‘public laws’ cannot not be effectively struck down by private parties, which 
creates the need for an instrument such as mutual recognition, but this does not apply to large 
parts of private law,  where private autonomy is able to avoid the application of restrictive 
laws.64 Mutual recognition can therefore not fulfil the same role in private laws as it does with 
respect to public laws. 
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Vested rights are therefore strongly centered around the individual. As observed in the 
literature, with regard to the recognition of acquired rights:  
 
“L’individu acquiert une dimension autonome au plan transnational. Il résulte de cette consécration de 
l’autonomie que chaque situation ou rapport juridique n’est pas forcément rattaché à un seul ordre 
juridique mais rayonne et peut être appréhendé par plusieurs. Il en résulte également que l’hypothèse 
de l’autonomie participe à un besoin de réglementation d’un rapport par la collaboration des ordres 
juridiques concernés, sans porter, autant que possible, atteinte à la cohérence du rapport privé”.65 
 
Mutual recognition is about the avoidance of a double burden: a manufacturer should 
not be asked to comply with the rules of both the member state of origin and the host member 
state. These ‘public’ laws are perceived as the imposer of duties, rather than the creator of 
rights. This is fundamentally different from ‘private law’ rules. Private law enables 
individuals to perform legal acts and to enter into legal relations and subsequently enforce the 
obtained rights. Private law thus ensures that individuals can create rights and obligations 
between each other. Legal subjects may benefit from the potential application of various sets 
of private law since this broadens the array of potential private law rights. On a European 
level, the impediment to free movement does not originate in the diversity of private law 
rights, but in the non-recognition of rights acquired under the private law system of a member 
state by another member state. 
 
Vested rights are therefore more than the inability to apply legislation of the host 
member state to a situation already governed by the laws of the member state of origin. 
Vested rights do not only require the host member state to refrain from imposing its 
conditions to creation of the right, but also the duty to accommodate the foreign rights into its 
own legal system. For example if Überseering would have gone bankrupt, it would for the 
German authorities not be sufficient to establish that limited liability existed and subsequently 
treat the company as a GmbH (German private limited company). Not only the creation but 
also the extent and conditions of the limited liability under Dutch law have to be incorporated 
into German law, even if the law applicable to the insolvency proceedings is German.66 
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VII. To what extent do European vested rights differ from the various historical 
conceptions? 
 
The vested rights doctrine in the European Union can overcome the critique that led to 
its original decline half a century ago. As von Savigny noted, it can only be ascertained if a right 
is duly acquired when one has identified the law applicable to the creation of that right.67 Pillet 
developed a separate PIL system to determine the competent legal order. In the Community, the 
development of a new system to establish the law applicable to the creation of a right would not 
be necessary. It is true that the recognition of an existing right should separated from the 
applicable law, but the PIL systems of the member states that determine the applicable law can 
be maintained. Subsequently, it can occur that different member states declare themselves, or 
are declared, competent. It is up to Community law to verify whether the connecting factor used 
by the member state is legitimate. If several member states use different legitimate connecting 
factors it is for private autonomy to decide the law applicable to the creation of the right. It is 
the introduction of party autonomy that avoids the rigidity that brought the vested rights of 
Beale and Pillet down. It should be recalled that the main criticism against the First 
Restatement, where a vested rights doctrine was laid down, was not directed against vested 
rights as such but rather at the rigid way of determining the applicable law. Where the 
obligation for recognition was initially sought in the comitas doctrine of Huber and later in 
principles of international law, it is within the common European justice area beyond doubt that 
the duty to recognise directly originates in Community law.  
 
VIII. Vested rights: A better insight of ECJ case law? 
 
Having the vested rights theory in the back of our mind we can also explain why the 
ECJ allows member states in tax law matters to combat wholly artificial arrangements for tax 
evasion purposes,68 but is not concerned with the setting up of a company in a member state, 
while all business is carried out in another member state, with the sole purpose of avoiding the 
latter member states stricter company laws. Company law entails a set of obligations, such as 
minimum capital requirement and disclosure, which a company accepts in order to obtain a 
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predetermined set of privileges, such as limited liability. Potential establishers of companies can 
only choose between company types that are created by the member state involved. There is 
already within a national legal system no choice about what type of tax payer one desires to be, 
let alone that on the international plane one can choose where one wants to pay tax. 
Fundamentally, there is an obligation to pay tax, but not a directly corresponding right. An 
undertaking does not obtain more rights when it pays a million euro company taxes instead of a 
euro. Tax law can therefore out of principle not be incorporated in a vested rights doctrine but 
has to be dealt with under the principle of mutual recognition. 
 
The vested rights theory is able to effectively distinguish between Daily Mail and 
Cartesio on the one hand, and Centros and Überseering on the other. The Court never 
distinguished between the right to exit and the right to enter. As soon as there exists a possibility 
under national law of the member state of origin to re-establish in another member state, 
Community law safeguards that right of establishment in the sense that a restriction of that right 
on either side has to be justified by an overriding provision of public interest.69 What matters is 
whether the company can invoke against the host member state a duly acquired right, the 
recognition of its privileges under a foreign law (for example limited liability). Whether a right 
is duly acquired depends on principle on the competent legal order. Art. 48 EC determines what 
the competent legal order is: either the jurisdiction where the company has its registered office, 
central administration or principal place of business. If the company desires to rely on its right, 
it could also very well prefer to be incorporated under German law if it moves its real seat from 
the Netherlands to Germany, the host member state is bound to respect it. Cartesio then 
perfectly fits in the pre-existing case law: there was no right that Cartesio could invoke against 
Hungary since Hungary already recognised all privileges resulting from incorporation under 
Hungarian law. 
 
Explaining Cartesio with the vested rights theory would not contribute much to a better 
understanding of the interrelationship between Community law, national private laws and PIL if 
its reasoning could not be expanded beyond the scope of company law. Art. 48 EC places legal 
persons on the same footing as natural persons with regard to the freedom of establishment. It 
might therefore be interesting to have a closer look at the Court’s case law in personal status 
issues. 
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IX. Surname law 
 
The approach of the Court can also be retrieved in surname law, equally an area where 
the Community has no direct competence and where between member states discrepancies in 
connecting factors exist. 
 
In Konstantinidis the transliteration of the name of a self-employed masseur into the 
Roman alphabet on his marriage certificate diverged from the transliteration in his Greek 
passport.70 The ECJ held that the national rules on transliteration are incompatible with the 
Community law if it causes a Greek national such a degree of inconvenience that it infringes his 
right of establishment. This would be the case if the divergence in transliteration modifies the 
pronunciation and would create the risk that potential clients may confuse him with other 
persons. In other words: Konstantinidis had the right to use his name duly acquired under Greek 
law also in Germany. 
 
In Garcia Avello, two children were born in Belgium out of a marriage between a 
Belgian and a Spanish national.71 According to Belgian and Spanish nationality law the children 
possessed the nationality of both member states. According to Belgian surname law the children 
bore the family name of the father, ‘Garcia Avello’. Spanish surname law allowed the parents to 
opt for a combination of the surnames of both parents. The couple registered the children at the 
Spanish embassy in Belgium under the surname ‘Garcia Weber’ and subsequently requested the 
Belgian authorities to change the surname, which was refused. The ECJ used European 
Citizenship to bring the situation into the scope of Community law.72 The fact that the children 
had Belgian nationality and were resident in Belgium since birth was irrelevant; the children 
were also Spanish nationals living in Belgium and could therefore not be discriminated against 
on the ground of nationality. Non-discrimination requires that equal situations should be treated 
equally and unequal situations unequally. Dual citizens are in a different situation compared to 
Belgians that only possess one nationality, since dual citizens can bear different surnames under 
different laws. Treating a request of change of surname of a dual citizen equal to that of a 
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‘single citizen’ would therefore amount to unequal treatment.73 Art. 12 in conjunction with art. 
17 EC therefore prevented a member state from refusing a change of surname if the requested 
surname would be in accordance with the law of a member state whose nationality the applicant 
also possessed.  
 
In the light of mutual recognition the case is problematic since it does not seem possible 
to establish a country of origin. Could it not be argued that the Spanish embassy was bound to 
refuse the registration of the surname ‘Garcia Weber’ since a different surname had already 
been attributed to the child in Belgium? The case is less problematic from the point of view of 
the vested rights theory. In both member states a right to a surname had been duly acquired 
under the same connecting factor (nationality), it is within the private autonomy of an individual 
to choose whether he desires to enforce a right or not. 
 
In Grunkin Paul, a child was born out of a marriage between two German nationals 
living in Denmark.74 Both the parents and the child only possessed German nationality. 
‘Grunkin-Paul’, an accumulation of the surname of both parents, was mentioned as surname on 
the Danish birth certificate of the child. Such an accumulation was possible under Danish law, 
but not under German law. Under Danish PIL the law applicable to the determination of a 
surname is the law of the place of habitual residence, while German PIL uses nationality as 
connecting factor. When the marriage broke down, the father moved to Germany and sought to 
register the child in Germany. Registration of the surname was refused since under German PIL 
the surname had to be determined according to German law, which required the parents to 
choose between the surname of the father and mother. A discrimination such as in Garcia 
Avello could not occur since the child only possessed German nationality and was treated 
equally compared to all other German nationals. The Court concluded however that a difference 
in surname could give rise to such an inconvenience (different surnames on diplomas, proof of 
identity) to create a disadvantage merely because the child exercised its freedom to move and to 
reside in another member state. The refusal therefore constituted a restriction on European 
Citizenship that could not be justified by any overriding public interest.75  
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Also, Grunkin and Paul demonstrates the difficulty of perceiving vested rights as a new 
form of mutual recognition combined with a country of origin approach. The parents exercised a 
fundamental freedom and the child born on the territory of Denmark only acquired German 
nationality; should Germany then not be classified as the country of origin? Rather, the Court 
resorts again to a party autonomy oriented approach. A member state is bound to respect a 
choice of law made by the parties. If the situation would have been the reverse, so that German 
surname law would have been more liberal than Danish surname law, it seems that Denmark 
would have to respect German law if the parties desired to invoke their right under German 
substantive law for the determination of the surname on the Danish birth certificate.  
 
Whereas the restriction in Garcia Avello originated in the joint reading of the general 
principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality and European Citizenship, the 
Court based its judgment in Grunkin Paul on citizenship alone. The Court in Grunkin and Paul 
moved away from the discrimination test it established in Garcia Avello, towards a test whether 
the difference in surname could create such a degree of inconvenience that it became more 
difficult for the individual concerned to exercise his rights as a citizen of the Union to move 
and reside freely throughout the territory of the member states. The shift of the Court fits into 
the gradually increasing attention of the Community of the free movement of citizens apart 
from economic transactions.76 
 
Vested rights allow member states to maintain their connecting factor and perhaps 
more importantly, does not require change of the substantive law. National cultural identities 
can be preserved. Since vested rights only impact the existing legal norms in a very limited 
way and operate independently from the connecting factors of the host member state they are 
able to significantly simplify current legal problems.77 Vested rights are specifically not meant 
to replace the normal conflict of law system, but at the avoidance of ‘limping relationships’; 
relationships that are lawful in one member state but not in others.78 Such situations are 
incompatible with the idea of a common European justice area. Legal fiction should be brought 
back in line with factual reality. What the vested rights doctrine does require is that purely 
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domestic situations are treated differently from situations involving a link with another 
member state. A different treatment of international situations is for European PIL not 
anything substantially new, but it narrows the question down. As AG Sharpston observed in 
her opinion in Grunkin and Paul: 
 
“I would stress therefore that my approach would not require any major change to Germany’s 
substantive or choice of law rules in the field of names, but would simply require them to allow greater 
scope for recognising a prior choice of name validly made in accordance with the laws of another 
member state. To that extent, it involves no more than an application of the principle of mutual 
recognition which underpins so much of Community law, not only in the economic sphere but also in 
civil matters”.79 
 
AG Jacobs, on the other hand, incorporated in his opinion in Konstantinidis a 
fundamental rights perspective.80 European citizens could rely on their status as such and invoke 
a core of rights (civis europeus sum), in particular the observance of fundamental rights.81 Such 
a political rights approach seems indeed to push back the role of PIL. From the outset it should 
be observed that citizenship and fundamental rights are two different things. Although both are 
claimed by individuals against the state, the latter are universal while the aim of the former is to 
make a distinction between the have and the have-nots. By reason of belonging to a certain 
political community, the citizen can claim certain rights that cannot be exercised by individuals 
not belonging to that political community.82 Nevertheless, AG Jacobs held in Konstantinidis 
that the transliteration could infringe Konstantinidis’ fundamental rights, in particular his right 
to private life as laid down in art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
obligation to bear different surnames under the law of different member states would be 
incompatible with private life, and therefore the status and rights of a European Citizen, since a 
name forms an intrinsic part of a person’s identity.83 Obviously, one cannot be required to 
maintain two different identities. A similar line can be discovered in his opinions in Standesamt 
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Niebüll84 and Garcia Avello.85 The fundamental rights perspective does not come back in the 
decisions of the Court, which seems more concerned with the classical internal market rationale. 
We must be careful with such an approach since it would enormously expand the scrutiny of the 
ECJ over national measures.   
 
Despite the hopeful words of AG Jacobs, ‘civis europeus sum’86,  European Citizenship 
in itself is not an autonomous generator of rights.87 Legal scholars must be careful not to take 
again an overexpansive interpretation of ECJ case law, as they did in company law. In a 
Community law context, European Citizenship might be used to broaden the interpretation of 
pre-existing rights. European Citizenship becomes instrumental for bringing a situation within 
the scope of Community law, triggering the obligation to recognise duly acquired rights. 
European Citizenship then does create any new rights, but ensures that not only rights obtained 
under Community law shall be sustained in member states, but also rights duly created in other 
member states. It is true that the Court has gradually moved from establishing an economic link. 
One should be careful not to misinterpret this shift as replacing the red line of creating an 
internal market that runs through ECJ case law with a political rights approach centered around 
the individual. Rather, the red line has become wider as to include, next to the creation of an 
internal market, the creation of a common justice area. The expansion of the Courts’ leitmotiv 
also reappeared in the attribution of competences in the Lisbon Treaty; art. 81 TFEU would do 
away with the internal market criterion.88 
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X. Extrapolation of Cartesio and Grunkin and Paul: Vested rights in other areas of 
private law? 
 
The vested rights seem therefore to have returned in the case law of the ECJ in two areas 
of private law. To what extent can it be incorporated in other areas of private law? Especially 
concerning questions of personal status the vested right doctrine seems to be able to make a 
more general contribution.89 Rights in surname and company law are however unilaterally 
created by registration, private autonomy thus means the liberty of a legal or natural person to 
choose the applicable PIL. Could the vested rights doctrine also be applied against more 
horizontally acquired rights, where private autonomy of two or more individuals is at stake, as 
for example in contract or torts?90 Especially with regard to security rights in (im)movables the 
vested rights doctrine seems to be able to make a useful contribution. Should for example a 
lawfully established German retention of title clause (Eigentumsvorbehalt) on a delivery of 
computers be recognised in the context of the insolvency proceedings of the Latvian buyer in 
Latvia?91  
 
Pamboukis stresses that rights obtained through registration by a public authority are an 
acte quasi public. The state by exercising its authority confirms the existence of a right. The 
semi-public nature justifies an analogy with the principle of mutual recognition of judgments.92 
With regard to horizontally acquired rights, what Pamboukis finds troublesome is that without 
state interference it is difficult to establish whether a right has been truly created. Normal 
conflict of laws rules are not apt to deal with existing rights, creating legal uncertainty and 
unforeseeability for the individual. Despite the difficulty of establishing whether a right has 
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been truly created, Pamboukis accepts that effect should also be given to real and existing 
private relationships under a foreign law.93 
 
From the outset, there seems indeed to be nothing that prevents a party from relying on a 
right acquired in another member state. Limited liability could be invoked against all creditors, 
thus including private parties. If duly acquired rights can be relied upon in horizontal situations, 
there seems to be no objection why they cannot also be created in horizontal situations.  
 
From the cited case law three conditions for the application of the vested rights doctrine 
can be inferred. The situation should fall into the scope of Community law, the PIL rules of 
member states must lead to the application of different substantive rules and finally, differences 
must exist between the potentially applicable legal systems.  
 
XI. The duty to recognise originates in community law 
 
Community law can only generate the duty to recognise a right duly acquired right when 
the situation falls within its scope.94 The first important limitation is thereby already given. The 
vested rights doctrine cannot apply to rights duly acquired in a non-member state. Germany is 
thus not obliged to recognise legal personality of a company incorporated under the laws of 
Switzerland, but with its main centre of business in Germany.95 To bring the situation into the 
scope of Community law, European Citizenship is of particular importance with regard to 
personal status.96 The test adopted in Grunkin and Paul, which determines whether a difference 
in surname could create such a degree of inconvenience that it causes a disadvantage to the right 
to freely reside in the territory of another member state, can also be applied to other personal 
status areas such as the recognition of adoption, lack of legal capacity, marriage or divorce.  
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With regard to divorce the approach that a divorce promulgated in another member state 
should be recognised is laid down in the Brussels IIbis Regulation.97 Non-recognition of divorce 
promulgated in another member state would impede the possibility of remarriage in the member 
state of non-recognition. Art. 21(1) therefore provides that judgments relating to divorce, legal 
separation or marriage annulment shall be recognised in other member states without any 
special procedure being required. Courts only possess limited grounds of non-recognition, 
including a public policy exception that has to be defined narrowly.98 Art. 25 provides explicitly 
for the possibility of multiple applicable national laws; “the recognition of a judgment may not 
be refused because the law of the member state in which such recognition is sought would not 
allow divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment on the same facts.”  
 
Party autonomy also becomes clear on a different point. The Regulation only applies to 
positive decisions, the recognition of a decision not to grant a divorce therefore falls outside the 
scope of the Regulation.99 Thus if a divorce between an Irish husband and a Belgian wife is 
denied in Ireland, parties could decide to file for a divorce in Belgium. Problematic is that 
Ireland is not bound to recognise the Belgian divorce if it is irreconcilable with a judgment 
given in proceedings between the same parties in the member state in which recognition is 
sought.100 It cannot be excluded that in such a situation the ECJ would decide that Ireland is 
nonetheless bound to recognise the divorce on the basis of European Citizenship since the 
difference in civil status would create such a degree of inconvenience that it causes a 
disadvantage to the right to freely reside in the territory of another member state. Such an 
inconvenience would be likely to occur if the Irish husband would remain after the divorce in 
Belgium, remarry and subsequently desires to move with his new spouse to Ireland. Ireland 
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would then due to the prohibition of polygamy not recognise the new marriage, impeding the 
right of the couple to move from Belgium to Ireland.101  
 
XII. Legitimate divergence of national connecting factors 
 
The second condition for the application of the vested rights doctrine is that member 
states can legitimately apply different connecting factors.102 In the literature, it has been debated 
whether nationality as such was a legitimate connecting factor or already in itself 
discriminatory.103 The point is addressed by AG Sharpston in Grunkin and Paul: 
 
“It is true that the rule in Paragraph 10 of the EGBGB [nationality as connecting factor, JJK] 
distinguishes between individuals according to their nationality, but such distinctions are inevitable 
where nationality serves as a link with a particular legal system. It does not, by contrast, discriminate on 
grounds of nationality. The purpose of the prohibition of such discrimination is not to efface the 
distinctions which necessarily flow from possession of the nationality of one member state rather than 
another (which are clearly maintained by the second sentence of Article 17(1) EC) but to preclude 
further differences of treatment which are based on nationality and which operate to the detriment of a 
citizen of the Union”.104 
 
The connecting factor determines the competent legal order(s). An excessive connecting 
factor, and thus an excessive claim for regulatory competence could potentially be struck down 
by the ECJ.105 The Court seems to have accepted both habitual residence and nationality as 
legitimate connecting factors in the area of surname law. That would mutatis mutandis also 
apply to all other areas of personal status. The different connecting factors lead to two or more 
potentially applicable legal systems. From a Community perspective, all national private law 
systems are equal and Community law cannot come up with a rule to determine the competent 
legal order (should nationality prevail over habitual residence, or vice versa). Community law 
can only observe that two or more member states can legitimately create the right, but the 
                                               
101
 The idea of vested rights can also be retrieved in the Green Paper on Succession and Wills, COM (2005) 65, 
final, 11. 
102
 W. ROTH, “Methoden der Rechtsfindung und Rechtsanwendung im Europäischen Kollisionsrecht”, IPRax, 
2006, vol. 26, pp. 338-347, at p. 344. 
103
 M. PUKJAK, Le droit international privé à l’épreuve du principe communautaire de non-discrimination en 
raison de la nationalité, Aix-en-Marseille, Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille (2003); 
ISRAEL/SAARLOOS supra note 52 but as well case C-305/92, Hoorn, 1994, ECR I-1525; case C-214/94 
Boukhalfa, 1996 ECR I-2253. 
104
 AG SHARPSTON, Grunkin and Paul, par. 62. 
105
 A possible excessive connecting factor could be automatic application of the lex fori.  
91 
 
decision under which law the right has to be duly created must be left to private autonomy. It is 
after all for an individual to decide whether he desires to rely on a right or not.  
 
Party autonomy in the applicable PIL constitutes a paradigm shift in PIL. Courts always 
resort to their own PIL to determine the competent legal order. Also, in the vested rights 
conception of Beale and Pillet it was the PIL of the forum that determined which legal order 
was competent to create the right concerned. However, Grunkin and Paul clearly goes further. 
Private parties can avoid the application of national PIL. The German court could not establish 
the competent legal order itself but had to accept that under Community law Denmark could 
declare itself to be a competent legal order and the parties had chosen the application of Danish 
PIL.  
 
When member states use the same connecting factor, the applicable legal system shall in 
principle be the same, regardless under which PIL system that applicable legal system is 
determined. The connecting factors in the area of contract and tort law have been harmonised by 
respectively the Rome I and Rome II Regulation.106 The connecting factor for contracts is the 
principle of the closest connection, which is in general the law of the place of the party that has 
to render the characteristic performance and in torts the lex loci damni applies. So, to a contract 
between a Greek seller and an Italian buyer Greek substantive law will apply regardless whether 
an action of enforcement is brought in Italy or in Greece. It will not be necessary for an Italian 
court to establish whether the Italian buyer duly acquired under Greek law any rights that could 
be enforced in an Italian court since the whole legal relationship has to be answered according 
to Greek law anyway.107 The doctrine of vested rights is then severely restricted; it can only 
come into to play when the right is invoked in a situation governed by a law different from the 
law that created the right.  
 
It could also occur that although member states use different connecting factors, they 
both refer to the same applicable legal system. If Spain would have used for the determination 
of a surname domicile as connecting factor instead of nationality, both Spanish and Belgium 
PIL would have referred in Garcia Avello to Belgian law as the applicable law. The children 
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would then not have acquired any right under Spanish law and could hence not invoke it before 
the Belgian courts. It is in principle for the member state concerned to determine whether an 
appropriate link with its legal system exists to trigger the application of its laws.108  
 
To return to the example of divorce, the applicable law to a divorce still has to be 
determined by the court seised. Since the Brussels IIbis Regulation allows for seven grounds of 
alternative jurisdiction109 and the member states use a plurality of connecting factors, such as 
nationality, domicile, habitual residence or automatic application of the lex fori, a risk of forum 
shopping arises. In divorce proceedings this may become extra problematic since it will work to 
the detriment of the weaker party, who can see an unfavourable law ‘imposed’ by the 
economically stronger, better informed party. In the vested rights doctrine it thus becomes 
crucial to delimit the competent jurisdiction that can legitimately create a right.110 The proposal 
for a Rome III Regulation seeks to delimitate the competent legal orders by harmonising the 
conflict of law rules of the member states. The law applicable to a divorce can to a certain 
extent be chosen by the parties, and in case of  lack of a choice, the law of the place where both 
parties have their habitual residence shall normally be applicable. The lex fori as connecting 
factor of last resort only fulfils a residual function, thereby significantly limiting the importance 
of the vested rights doctrine.111 
 
Vested rights thus do not provide an unlimited possibility of choices. Required for a 
right to be duly established is that the law establishes that the right is designated as applicable 
by one of the PIL systems of the member states. In Grunkin and Paul the parents could 
therefore not have relied on the Spanish tradition of establishing surnames. Usually this will 
require a link with the applicable legal system, but Centros and Inspire Art demonstrate that the 
link can be rather loose or even artificially created. Whereas with regard to the freedom of 
establishment the possible connecting factors are laid down in the Treaty (art. 48), this is not the 
case with surname law. The Court relied on state practice and international conventions to 
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conclude that both the use of nationality as well as habitual residence as connecting factor was 
reasonable. In case of the threat of abuse, connecting factors have to be harmonised to prevent 
abuse to the detriment of the weaker party. 
 
XIII. Legitimate divergence between potentially applicable national laws 
 
Obviously the legal norm applicable should differ on a substantive level from the 
otherwise potentially applicable law. If the conditions of the grant of a divorce would be set by 
the European legislator it would not matter whether one applies the law of Belgium or Ireland to 
a divorce. Under both legal systems the outcome of the proceedings will be identical. Not only 
the of vested rights will be marginalised, but also that of PIL as a whole.112 
 
XIV. Pulling the emergency break: Public policy 
 
One element of the vested rights doctrine has until so far not been discussed. Courts will 
not enforce a right when recognition would violate the public policy of the forum. From the 
outset it is clear that the grounds of non-recognition of a right acquired in another member state 
should be interpreted narrowly.113 The intentional evasion of stricter Danish minimum capital 
requirements in Centros was not enough to justify non-recognition. What becomes also clear 
from that judgment and Inspire Art is that the application of public policy should be decided on 
a case by case basis. Although the Brussels IIbis Regulation provides for wider grounds of non-
recognition than public policy, for example a court may decide not to recognise a divorce when 
that is incompatible with an earlier judgment rendered in a dispute between the same parties in 
the member state in which recognition is sought, the automatic imposition of public policy in a 
situation with a certain foreign element will not pass the proportionality test. Public policy 
might have a stronger role in dealing with politically more sensitive rights. In the United States 
for example, public policy has been discussed as a potential tool for the non-recognition of 
same-sex marriages.114 Could Poland apply its public policy as a justification for the non-
recognition of a Dutch same-sex marriage?  
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The Dutch State Committee on PIL considered the predecessor of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, the Brussels II Regulation, also to be applicable to same-sex marriage. Since the 
Community lacks a common definition of ‘marriage’, it should be left to the member states to 
define what a marriage is.115 Whether a marriage is validly concluded in the Netherlands should 
therefore be left to be determined by Dutch law. The European Commission itself recognises the 
Dutch same-sex marriage as ‘marriage’ for internal purposes.116 However, the German 
Verwaltungsgericht in Karlsruhe refused on the basis of the public policy exception to recognise 
a Dutch same-sex marriage between a Dutch and a Taiwanese national residing in Germany, 
when the Taiwanese national applied as spouse of a migrant worker for a German residence 
permit under art. 10 of Regulation 1612/68.117 France recently followed the example of the 
Commission and did not apply its public policy exception but instead recognised for tax 
purposes a Dutch same-sex marriage between two Dutch nationals residing in France.118 
Although it is for member states to define the notion ‘marriage’ it is equally within the 
discretion of the member state to define, within the limits of Community law, the content of 
their public policy. It seems unlikely that the ECJ will use European Citizenship to settle such a 
politically sensitive question.  
 
XV. Conclusion 
 
The case law of the ECJ in company law and surname law is not completely Community 
law, because Community law in itself does not generate the right but depends on the various 
national solutions. Community law however requires the non-application of national rules that 
would prevent the exercise of a right acquired in another member state. In that sense it does not 
create any new rights but only enforces what is valid under the laws of the member state of 
creation. The case law does however also not fit in national private law since it leads to the 
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creation of rights that are unavailable under national remedies and is neither PIL since the case 
law does not establish a law which is competent to create the right concerned. Instead the case 
law hovers between the legal disciplines and necessitates us to fundamentally rethink the 
relationship between Community law and PIL. A right duly created in one member state shall 
be recognised in other member states. It seems the revival of the vested rights doctrine, a PIL 
theory that has its roots in the writings of the Frisian scholar Ulrik Huber, and that was declared 
dead many years ago. 
 
Vested rights do not interfere with the national private law rules. It only requires that a 
situation with a foreign element should be treated differently from a purely domestic situation. 
That is not something new. Vested rights do not require a member state to adopt a certain 
connecting factor. The connecting factor constitutes the link that determines the competent legal 
order. In the vested rights doctrine that is crucial since the acceptation that vested rights should 
be recognised does not answer the question according to which law the right has to be duly 
established. Community law controls the connecting factors and prevents member states from 
claiming to broad regulatory competences. On the other hand, Community law ensures that if a 
right is duly acquired according to a law designated by one of the PIL systems of the member 
states, it is not open for other member states to second-guess the operation of the connecting 
factors of the first member state. Private autonomy identifies from the various competent legal 
orders the legal order according to which the right has to be created. 
 
Vested rights can simplify the existing legal jungle when the situation falls into the 
scope of Community law, the PIL rules of member states lead to the application of different 
substantive rules and finally, differences exist between the potentially applicable legal systems. 
The link with Community law generates the obligation to recognise, whereas the practical effect 
of vested rights would be severely limited if all PIL systems would refer to the same applicable 
law or where the application of the law of the different member states would lead to identical 
results.  
 
Although a right may be duly established it could still manifestly violate the public 
policy of the member state in which recognition is sought. The public policy has however to be 
construed narrowly.  It can only protect the core values of the forum. 
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The doctrine of vested rights allows us a better insight into the company and surname 
case law of the ECJ. There is no principal differentiation between the right to entry or the right 
to exit. Restrictions on both rights will be under the scrutiny of Community law. A vested right 
can however only be invoked against the host member state and not the member state of origin. 
There was no right that Cartesio could invoke against Hungary since Hungary already 
recognised all privileges resulting from incorporation under Hungarian law. The decision of the 
Court in Centros is therefore still standing and regulatory competition is far from dead. 
 
In family law European Citizenship may trigger the application of Community law. The 
Court has moved away from the establishment of economical links or the existence of 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality but instead adopted a test aimed at establishing 
whether a difference in surname (but potentially also other personal statutes) could create such a 
degree of inconvenience that it causes a disadvantage to the right to freely reside in the territory 
of another member state. It seems that vested rights can therefore especially in the field of 
family provide for increased legal certainty and above all, simplification.  
 
The private international law solution as represented by the vested rights approach 
should be welcomed since it is able to serve two often conflicting ends. Vested rights serve the 
interest of the Community by taking away obstacles as a result of discrepancies in personal 
status and thereby promoting the common European justice area. At the same time vested rights 
do not necessitate any change of connecting factor or substantive law and thus allows member 
states to preserve their national identity. 
